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STATEMENT OF DISPUTED AND ADDITIONAL FACTS 
1. The real property in question is not a "lot". This 
parcel of land was a portion of a regularly subdivided lot, but 
did not constitute a lot in and of itself. (Trial Transcript 60, 
hereinafter "Tr."). The subdivision laws of the State of Utah and 
the Municipality of Draper reserve the designation of "lot" for 
those parcels of land which have been approved as a subdivision by 
the Municipality. § 57-5-1, et. seq. Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended). In this case, there was a 2-acre lot which had been 
informally divided by the Defendants into two parcels. The 
Defendants knew that the property had not been acknowledged, 
certified, approved and recorded as a subdivision when they sold 
the land to Plaintiffs. (Tr. 60). 
2. The Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend was made at the 
conclusion of Plaintiffs' case and prior to the commencement of 
the Defendant's case. 
3. The decision of the Judge to view the subject 
premises was made on the Court's own motion and not upon the 
motion of the Defendant. 
4. The purchase price contemplated by the agreement of 
the parties was for a parcel which could be built upon, at that 
time, or sold, subsequently, as such. Although the Plaintiffs did 
not initially intend to build upon the parcel in question, they 
believed that the purchase price could be recouped later upon its 
sale as a building lot. (Tr. 156). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Mistake is a kindred defense to fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation. These defenses share many of the same 
elements. The issue of mistake was therefore sufficiently tried, 
without objection by these Defendants, and the parties understood, 
particularly after the Plaintiffs' motion, that this defense would 
be presented. Defendants had a fair opportunity in the 
presentation of their case to defend and introduce evidence. 
Illegality may be raised, for the first time, on appeal. 
In this case it was raised in Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and for 
a new trial. Public policy and fairness require that the defense 
be applied to the facts in this case. 
II. The Defendants actively deceived the Plaintiffs and 
concealed factual information which was material. Therefore, the 
Plaintiffs are relieved from the same duty of investigation which 
would otherwise apply. 
III. It is clear from the trial judge's memorandum opinion 
that his view of the property, in its then current state, as 
opposed to the circumstances at the time of the transaction, was 
pivotal in his decision. Because of the changed nature of the 
area as well as the role the view played in the judge's decision, 
the view was improper. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND TO CONFORM TO THE 
EVIDENCE IS PROPER, 
A) The Court abused its discretion in denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend as to mutual mistake of fact. 
Plaintiffs' counsel moved to amend their Complaint at the 
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conclusion of the Plaintiffs' case and in so doing it was asserted 
that the elements of mutual mistake of fact were the same of those 
of negligent misrepresentation. (R. 200). The Defendants enjoyed 
the entire period of their defense to address mutual mistake of 
fact. The Defendants admit that the evidence of mistake (and 
illegality for that matter) "would also support the Plaintiffs' 
claim for fraud." (Appellee's Brief p. 7). Defendants raised no 
objection at the time of argument on the motion which would 
establish surprise, lack of fair opportunity to defend, lack of 
understanding of the defense, or prejudice. (R. 200-204). 
The elements required to establish the mandatory 
requirement for granting a party's Motion to Amend are: 1) that 
the issue be sufficiently tried; 2) with no objection; 3) with 
implied or express consent; 4) with an understanding as to the 
nature of the evidence and defense; and 5) a fair opportunity to 
defend. Each of these elements are met in this case. (Cite?) 
The Defendants' reliance upon Stratford v. Morgan, 689 
P.2d 360 (Utah 1984) is misplaced. In that case, the plaintiffs 
had previously indicated to the court that they did not intend to 
rely upon the theory of adverse possession which they later 
attempted to assert. In addition, the plaintiffs had failed to 
establish a very material element of proof related to that claim. 
Those factors are not present in this case. 
Reliance upon Westley v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 663 
P. 2d 93 (Utah 1983) is inapplicable because the amendment of 
plaintiff's complaint in that case to include an allegation known 
by the parties one year prior would have delayed the trial. 
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Westley did not deal with kindred defenses whose elements were 
alike, and only differed in terms of remedy and relief, as in the 
case at bar. Rather, the amendment of that complaint would have 
required additional trial preparation on defendant's part and 
therefore would have prolonged the litigation. 
B) The defense of illegality applies to this case and 
may be raised at any time, even subsequent to the trial* 
Because of the special nature of this defense, public 
policy allows that it be raised subsequent to the trial, even upon 
appeal, and by the court if necessary. Mitchell v> American 
Savings and Loan Association, 593 P.2d 692, 693-694 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1979). See also Greer v. Northwestern National Insurance 
Company, 674 P.2d 1257 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). 
The Defendants in their brief suggest that the Plaintiffs 
have misconstrued the application of this defense. Furthermore, 
they argue that the contract at issue here in not prohibited by 
statute. (Defendants' Brief p. 9). 
The Defendants specifically acknowledged at trial that 
there is a difference between a variance and a subdivision (Tr. 
201). While the Defendants address the necessity of a variance in 
order to build on the subject property in their brief, they 
utterly failed to discuss the implications of an unapproved 
subdivision, and sales of purported "lots" thereof. (Defendants' 
Brief p. 16). 
§ 57-5-5 Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) clearly 
prohibits the very act complained of in this case on the part of 
Defendants. Furthermore, that section makes it a crime to sell a 
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"lot" as the Defendants did herein. 
"The general rule is that a contract prohibited by law is 
a legal and unenforceable." Williams v. Continental Life and 
Accident Company, 593 P.2d 708, 710 (Idaho 1979). The Williams 
court quoted 6A A. Corbin, Contracts § 1540 (1962) as follows: 
"If a bargain is illegal, not because a 
performance promised under it is an illegal 
performance, but only because the party 
promising it is forbidden by statue or 
ordinance to do so, the prohibition is aimed at 
the party only and he is the only wrongdoer." 
593 P.2d at 710. 
This is precisely the case before the court. The 
Defendants knew that the property had not been legally subdivided 
(Tr. 60). Nevertheless, they sold the property as a subdivided 
lot. Utah Code Ann. § 57-5-5 clearly prohibits such an act. To 
ignore this defense now, or to deny the Motion to Amend to include 
it, would result in a severe injustice. It would perpetuate the 
Defendants1 illegal conduct which had its inception in the sale of 
property to the Plaintiff. 
C) The Plaintiffs have sufficiently established a case 
for mistake. 
Applying the test found in Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770 
(Utah 1985), and set forth in Defendants' Brief at page 10, the 
facts introduced at trial were sufficient to establish mistake. 
The mistake which Plaintiffs relied upon induced them to pay 
nearly $20,000 more for the property than what it was actually 
worth. To enforce an illegal contract which caused such expense 
to the Plaintiffs would be unconscionable. The mistake clearly 
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related to the potential development of the property which was 
material to the price paid by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs would be 
sufficiently compensated if Defendants lost the benefit of their 
bargain and Plaintiffs were returned to the status quo. 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs did not use ordinary 
diligence in determining the status of the property based upon the 
trial court's finding. Judge Noel viewed the property in 1988 and 
decided that a reasonable person shoud have been alerted to access 
problems which should have been investigated. (R. 205-206). 
The fact is, Plaintiffs lived on adjoining property when 
they purchased this parcel and there was no access problem at that 
time. In fact. Plaintiffs were motivated to purchase the property 
after seeing a realtor with clients who had easily accessed that 
parcel. Access is not the issue in any event. The issue was and 
is whether the parcel sold to Plaintiffs could be built upon and 
the mistaken belief that it could be developed in its condition as 
an illegally subdivided parcel of property. 
The most telling fact regarding the intent of the parties 
as to the nature and value of the land is its purchase price. The 
evidence presented at trial indicates that the land, in its then 
current state, would have a market value of $8,000 (Tr. 28). That 
is 31% of the actual purchase price, $26,000. A lot that had been 
subdivided and was ready for building would have a value 
approximating that which was negotiated by these parties. 
The Defendant relies upon Lewis v. White, 269 P.2d 865 
(Utah 1954). However, in that case there had been no "active 
deception or concealment". Jxl. at 866. In this case, there was 
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exactly that on the part of the Defendants. Where there exists 
such active deception and concealment, the holding of Lewis 
requiring investigation by the plaintiffs does not apply. 
The Defendant mistakes the fundamental fact in support of 
illegality which undermines not only the Defendants1 conduct but 
the decision of the court. That fact is not the lack of access to 
a public street. It is not even the necessity for a variance. 
Rather, it is the fact that the parcel of land was represented or 
held out as a subdivided lot when in fact it was not. Its sale as 
such was illegal. Finally, the failure to inform the Plaintiffs 
of this fact, well known to the Defendants, was active deception 
and concealment. 
POINT II: 
WHILE THE DECISION TO VIEW THE PROPERTY WAS 
APPROPRIATE, THE USE OF THE VIEW IN THE COURT'S 
DECISION WAS NOT PROPER, 
The Defendants rely primarily upon Thomas v. National 
State Bank, 628 P.2d 188 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) for the proposition 
that the view was appropriate. In Thomas the defendant moved for 
and requested the view. Additionally, there was no suggestion in 
that case that the area being viewed had changed, as there is in 
this case. 
A view, in and of itself, is not inappropriate. However, 
for the reasons set forth in the Plaintiffs1 brief, it must be 
shown that the premises to be viewed are substantially the same at 
the time of the view as when the claim arose. Likewise, it must 
be established that the inspection will be fair to all parties. 
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Lastly, the view should not be the source of independent evidence. 
Rather, it is used to clarify and harmonize. 
The Judge's Memorandum Decision in this case indicates 
that the view of the property was of such a vital and pivotal 
importance that it must be construed as extrinsic evidence which 
was used to corroborate and/or discredit the testimony of 
witnesses, which is inappropriate (See cases cited in Plaintiffs1 
brief). At least, the parties should have been afforded an 
opportunity to establish the difference between the state of the 
premises at the time of the trial, and at the time of the 
transaction. 
CONCLUSION 
The ruling of the trial court should be reversed and 
remanded for a new trial on the merits for three reasons. First, 
the trial court erred in refusing to allow Plaintiffs to amend 
their Complaint to conform to the evidence presented at trial. 
Second, there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of 
fraud and/or negligent misrepresentation on the part of the 
Defendants. Finally, the Judge improperly relied upon his view of 
the property in his finding in favor of the Defendants. 
For these reasons, Plaintiffs should prevail in their 
appeal of this matter. 
DATED this / 3 day of June, 1989. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
GREEN- & BERRY 
FREDERICK N. GREEN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
COMES NOW Frederick N. Green, attorney for the Plaintiffs 
in the above-entitled action, and hereby certifies that he has 
served Thomas N. Crowther with four (4) copies of the Plaintiffs' 
Reply Brief by mailing true and correct copies thereof to Thomas 
N. Crowther of the firm of Parsons & Crowther, attorneys for 
Defendants, at 455 South 300 East, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84111, on this /3 day of L'Clft& / 1989. 
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